Nomic subsumption theory

That is what one would expect on a nomic subsumption theory of causation. On such a theory it is natural to view causal locutions as promissory notes singular causal statements that contain them will entail that there is a law covering the events in question without entailing what the law is (Davidson, 1980). The promissory notes should all be cashed out by the time we arrive at fundamental laws. 

I think, however, that we need not despair of resolving the issue, though I don t expect to resolve it here. 1 think that the issue can be adequately addressed without settling the matter of what, exactly, causation is. The leading theories of causation are nomic subsumption theories, counter-factual theories, and transference theories. " Let us set aside transference theories and also nomic subsumption theories according to which laws involve a kind oisuigeneris nomic necessity. Let us focus on only regularity and counterfactual theories - non-oomph theories - and avoid any appeal to the idea of causal work. ... 

Nor is the issue that separates them whether causation analytically requires such oomph factors. Kim does not maintain that causation analytically requires transference. Nomic subsumption and counterfactual theories of causation are offered as analyses of our concept of causation, as statements of noncircular conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for causation. In contrast, transference theorists typically do not purport to be offering that kind of conceptual analysis. That causation does not analytically require such oomph factors is common ground between Kim and Loewer. 

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