Mind-brain identity theory

Our puzzle, the conundrum of the title, can now be restated in simple and familiar terms. The causal roles of our brain states are a function of the kinds of properties studied in neuroscience, but these kinds of properties are not mental properties — or so says the conventional wisdom that states that functionalism refuted the mind-brain identity theory understood as a type-type theory. It seems, therefore, that mental properties are causal idlers. 

I think this leads to, or anyway invites, a misunderstanding of the structure of physicalist identity theories of color and of mind. It su ests that they embody a dualism of property and concept the color properties are, on the theory, reflectance properties (if that is the answer color science delivers at the end of the day), whereas the concept of color is quite different from the concept of reflectance likewise, mental properties are brain properties, but the concept of a mental state is not that of a brain property (whether or not Armstrong is right that it is the concept of a state apt for the production of certain behaviors). 

Does an explication along these lines, plus a denial of type-identity theory, capture the intuition behind token-identity theory Token identity theorists assume that H2O is more fundamental than water. Even if, on their view, the kind water does not reduce to the kind H2O, there is directionality involved being a water-token is less fundamental than being an H20-token. Similarly, if substance dualism is false then thoughts reduce to brain-processes, what appears to you as the referent of T , when uttered by you, reduces to the spatio-temporal, physical object or chain of events that is you, and your particular mind reduces to the set of particular neural and, maybe, bodily events, just like every other mind reduces to the corresponding neural and bodily substance or chain of events. Thus construed. 

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