Metaphysical explanations

Lisa Lloyd I disagree with what Professor Williams just said. I think that every time you use the word reductionist , I would have used analysis . I think that it is correct that scientists use analysis to break systems down, but I think of reductionism as being something else which is the complete description of entire systems in terms of entities at a lower level. That s the sort of standard philosophical definition of reductionism which has a lot more metaphysical and epistemological bite than does the kind of analytic method that you are describing. So I would want to distinguish between analysis as a method, a set of approaches that all scientists do use, and reductionism as a set of commitments about what the ultimate aims of science or of a scientific theory would be, which is explanation at the lowest possible level. Does that make sense to you ... 

The question whether atoms exist or not.. . belongs rather to metaphysics. In chemistry we have only to decide whether the assumption of atoms is an hypothesis adapted to the explanation of chemical phenomena. . . [and] whether a further development of the atomic hypothesis promises to advance our knowledge of the mechanisms of chemical phenomena.. .. I rather expect that we shall some day find, for what we now call atoms, a mathematico-mechanical explanation, which will render an account of atomic weight, of atomicity, and of numerous other properties of the so-called atoms. 50... 

Let not the simplicity of this method cause yon to discard it in favor of some more technical, complicated or metaphysical theoretical method. This method overrides all theories of Lhe metaphysial schools—and analysis of the latter, divested of the surrounding iheories, will sbow the underlying principle of this method in fun operation tu each and every one of them. Why not discard and tear off the encumbering theories and "explanations ud... 

Metaphysical assertions, however, are statements of the psyche, and are therefore psychological. To the Western mind, which compensates its well- known feelings of resentment by a slavish regard for "rational" explanations, this obvious truth seems all too obvious, or else it is seen as an inadmissible negation of metaphysical "truth." Whenever the Westerner hears the word "psychological," it always sounds to him like "only psychological."... 

Regarding the problems of the electronic structure of molecular systems, we notice that in the past, the importance of the qualitative concepts and explanations has been stressed many times. In this context, V.A. Fock [3,4] discussed the (basically metaphysical) problem of interrelation between exact solution and approximate explanation . His point was that any approximation (more precisely, the general form of the trial electron wave function i.e. an Ansatz used for it) sets the system of qualitative concepts (restricted number of variables), which can only be used for interpreting the calculation results and for describing the experiments. A characteristic example... 

In the abstract, it might be tempting to imagine that irreducible complexity simply requires multiple simultaneous mutations—that evolution might be far chancier than we thought, but still possible. Such an appeal to brute luck can never be refuted. Yet it is an empty argument. One may as well say that the world luckily popped into existence yesterday with all the features it now has. Luck is metaphysical speculation scientific explanations invoke causes. It is almost universally conceded that such sudden events would be irreconcilable with the gradualism Darwin envisioned. Richard Dawkins explains the problem well ... 

In short, philosophers and scientists cannot and should not rely uncritically on shape or spatial properties as "starting points" for explanation. Nor can they rely uncritically on the claim that microstructure is an essential property of substances. This flows from the naturalistic metaphysical stance I have adopted here. Again, on the account given, a particular shape does not "belong" essentially to matter as a "basic" physical feature. Whether a particular "structure" can be imputed to a sample is a contingent matter. That seems enough to conclude it is false that molecular shape is essential. Some other property (such as mere extension) might be essential—that is, invariant and explanatory in all contexts. But shape is not. 

Returning now to fitness, we may be sure that, whatever successes science shall in the future celebrate within the domain of teleology, the philosopher will never cease to perceive the wonder of a universe which moves onward from chaos to very perfect harmonies, and, quite apart from any possible mechanistic explanation of origin and fulfillment, to feel it a worthy subject of reflection. .. 1 cannot hope to have provided more than a very imperfect illumination of certain aspects of teleology in this venture upon the foreign field of metaphysics, and I should wish to be understood as very doubtful of my success in stating what seem to me some of the philosophical conclusions to be drawn from the fitness of the environment. 

Many explanations have been advanced for the fact that philosophers have so stubbornly neglected chemistry as if it were virtually non-existent. Is it the lack of big questions in chemistry, its close relationship to technology, or the historically rooted pragmatism of chemists and their lack of interest in metaphysical issues Or, is the alleged reduction of chemistry to physics (quantum mechanics) the main obstacle, so that, if chemistry were only an applied branch of physics, there would be no genuine philosophical issue of chemistry ... 

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