Marine Regiments

Operations Log, Task Force Ripper 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment After Action Review 8th Marines Command Chronology 1 st Marine Division, Manoeuvre Chronology... 

Less successful was the experience during November and December of the 19th Marine Regiment, which found the weapon incapable of neutralizing enemy strongpoints because of its short range. Nevertheless, flame terriAed the enemy and on several occasions caused him to flee from his defensive positions. ... 

On the day of attack, 15 September 1944, the elaborate plan for using the flame tractors completely broke down. The ist Marine Regiment was stopped by stiff resistance just beyond the beach, and its flame tractor waited five hours for some kind of order. The flame vehicles with the other regiments were told to stand offshore out of danger. When the three flame tractors eventually landed they stood idle on the beaches, a result no doubt of extreme confusion and the unfamiliarity of the marines with the weapon. Inactivity on the second day was caused by the fact that the air compressor had not yet landed. The flame vehicles saw action on the third day, and from then on their commitment was regular. ... 

Inside 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Kuwait Regiment reports that it is... 

The first Hawaiian Department gas warfare plan, which was coordinated with the local Navy and Marine Corps commands, was dispatched to the War Department on 8 February 1943. The plan simply indicated that in the event of gas warfare maximum use of available weapons and equipment would be made, and no request for special supplies was included. The heart of the plan consisted of a detailed plea for the immediate provision of chemical units and manpower, including a chemical weapons regiment, air and ground service troops, and chemical staff personnel. The War Department at first indicated that no troops were available but in July requested restudy and resubmission of the troop request. Unmacht replied by reviewing the problems of preparedness. In his opinion these were (r) lack of... 

On II December 1943 the forward advance of the 21st Regiment, 3d Marine Division, was halted by an enemy position on Hill 1000. One of the Marine Corps officers described the obstacle as follows ... 

The preinvasion preparations of the three Marine divisions earmarked for Iwo included work with both the portable and the mechanized flame throwers. For the smaller weapon this preparation consisted mostly of integrating the flame throwers with the assault teams. It was 3d Marine Division policy to have in each of its battalions an assault platoon made up of 6 men from each rifle company and 2 men from the battalion headquarters company. These 20 men, specially trained in the use of flame throwers, rocket launchers, and demolitions, were placed under the immediate control of the battalion commander. The commander in turn could attach the whole platoon, or a part of it, to his assault companies as the situation required. Other Marine divisions devised similar platoons. Regiments of the 4th Marine Division organized 3 9-man platoons which were attached to each battalion landing team. Squads from these platoons were then assigned to companies for specific missions. ... 

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