Kissingers New Representation of the Chinese

4 Akin to a modern-day Marco Polo — indeed, Kissinger s secret mission was code-named Polo.  

Furthermore, Kissinger observed that, apart from the symbolic political gains associated with the visit, Beijing sought concrete objectives through a bilateral dialogue. These included the reduction of U.S. forces on Taiwan, a formal U.S. acknowledgement of the importance of China 

Kissinger was fundamentally convinced that hardened ideologues like Mao and Zhou could execute a volte face of this magnitude because of 

9 My Talks with Chou En-lai, pp. 6 also Kissinger to RN, My October China Visit The Atmospherics, 29 October 1971, Box 851, NSF, NPM, pp. 7-8. 

Memcon, 10 July 1971, i2..io-6pm,Box85i,NSF,NPM,pp. 5,13-19,33-5 Kissinger to RN, My Talks with Chou Enlai, p. 8. In both cases, Kissinger had been obliged to play a cool hand and suggest the postponement of the summit if the Chinese were not ready. 

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