Goal-violation effect

Goal-violation effect (GVE). Similar to an AVE, this effect includes violation of goals that may not be linked to abstinence. 

The primary physics goal of PEP-II is the. systematic study of CP-violating effects in neutral B decays. Such a study can extend our understanding of CP violation physics by testing whetlier the effects in various decay channels are relatc d as predicted lyy the Standard Model. 

The worker knew that valve A had to be closed. However, it was believed by the workforce that despite the operating instructions, closing B had a similar effect to closing A and in fact produced less disruption to downstream production. Possible cause violation as a result of mistaken information and an informal company culture to concentrate on production rather than safety goals (wrong intention). 

Recent developments in organic inspection and certification focus on the development of a risk-oriented approach, in addition to the annual inspection visit. When inspecting the operators, the amount of time spent must be flexible and should be more orientated to goals and risks. Sanctions must be effective and strongly discourage violations. 

The scope of the present review is to emphasize that thermodynamics can explain the above experimental observations. The next section (Section 2), which is based on ref. [10], will be concerned with the effects of HLB (denoted in what follows h) on the interfacial tension and on the stability of macroemulsions, the goal being to explain the observations of Boyd et al. [5] and of Berger et al. [4]. Section 3, which is based on ref. [11], will examine the effect of temperature on the interfacial tension at the oil-water interface by assuming that no microemulsion or emulsion is formed, as well as its effect on the stability of emulsions. Shinoda and Saito s observations regarding the equality of the two inversion temperatures will be thus explained. Finally, the Bancroft rule [8,9], and some of the violations of this rule, will be examined in the spirit of ref. [12],... 

Safety goals are primarily formulated as follows Avoid that a possible malfunction violates a safety goal . All possible malfunctions could be systematically analyzed if they have the potential to violate safety goals. All functions on the vehicle system level of the ITEM could be analyzed for potential malfunctions. The malfunction could be considered as failure or errors. The negation of the safely goals could be considered as top-failure of the FMEA so that they could be handled as possible failure effects. If the technical errors from the Technical Safely Concept are considered as failure causes, and malfunctions, errors or failure in the Functional Safely Concept as failure type a typical 3 level FMEA could be considered. The FMEA could demonstrate completeness for... 

This is the classical domain of the FMEA. At this point all possible malfunctions of a respective level are evaluated whether they can propagate to a given safely goal or if they are a possible cause of a failure effect, that violates safety goals. Here a classical FMEA could claim completeness related to the considered scope of analysis. 

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