Induction enumerative

Comment Since enumerative induction is not hypothetico-deductivist, the example is irrelevant to a Popperian, or falsificationist, interpretation of cladistics. A scientific theory justifies a method only insofar as the method depends on the theory in the sense that the method must generate an observational report that is relevant to the theory. If in scientific explanation the explicans logically entails the explicandum, as was argued by Popper, it must be the theory that determines what observations are relevant, not the method (Korner, 1970). 

The difQculties of the descriptive problem are sometimes underrated, because it is supposed that inductive reasoning follows a simple pattern of extrapolation, with More of the Same as its fundamental principle. Thus one predicts that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has risen every day in the past, or that all ravens are black because aU observed ravens are black. This model of enumerative induction has, however, been shown to be strikingly inadequate as an account of inference in science. On the one hand, a series of formal arguments, most notably the so-called raven paradox and the new riddle of induction, have shown lhat the enumerative model is wildly over-permissive, treating virtually any observation as if it were evidence for any hypothesis. On the other hand, the model is also much too restrictive to account for most scientific inferences. Scientific hypotheses typically appeal to entities and processes not mentioned in the evidence that supports than and often themselves unobservable and not merely unobserved, so the principle of more of the same does not apply. For example, while the enumerative model might account for the inference that a scientist makes from the observation that the light from one star is red shifted to the conclusion that the light from another star will be led-shified as well, it will not account for the inference from observed red-shift to unobserved recession [ 14]. 

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