Disparate impact

A legislative goal to avoid the disparate impact on African Americans of a race-neutral medicine, which would disproportionately disadvantage African Americans, should not be impermissible just because racial categories are used. It neither stigmatizes, denigrates, nor harms African Americans or whites. It is a constitutionally acceptable way of meeting the health care needs of the population as a whole. Indeed, failure to take race into account could mean that the health needs of some members of the community will not be met. 

Ayres, I., et al., "Racial Equity in Renal Transplantation The Disparate Impact of HLA-Based Allocation," JAMA, 270, 1352-1356 (1993). 

To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to strengthen and improve Federal civil rights laws, to provide for damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination, to clarify provisions regarding disparate impact actions, and for other purposes. 

Under the Disparate Impact theory, safety professionals should be aware that conduct that appears fair on its face but can detrimentally affect a number of individuals in a protected class can also constitute discrimination. However, safety professionals should be aware that if the employer has a job-related or business reason for this different treatment, this conduct may be permissible. For example, the safety professional is incurring a number of back injuries in the dock area where employees are lifting constantly. The company, in an effort to rednce back injuries, requires all employees to be able to lift X lbs. This conduct may disproportionally affect female employees. If the company possesses a valid business reason, such as reduction of back injuries, this may be appropriate however, even with a valid business reason, this practice may constitute discrimination if an alternative method, such as lifting assist equipment, exists that would not disproportionally affect the female employees. 

Several days after the meeting, Ude sent a letter to the CSB purporting to outline its duties with respect to the examination results. Ude stated that under federal law, a statistical demonstration of disparate impact, standing alone, constitutes a sufficiently serious claim of racial discrimination to serve as a predicate for 2667 employer-initiated, voluntar[y] remedies-even. .. race-conscious remedies. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 07-1428, p. 443a see also 554 F.Supp.2d, at 145 (issue of disparate impact appears to have been raised by. .. Ude ). 

CSB Chairman Segaloff asked Ude several questions about the Title VII disparate-impact standard. 

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Respondents asserted they had a good-faith belief that they would have violated the disparate-impact prohibition in Title VII, 2000e-2(k), had they certified the examination results. It follows, they maintained, that they cannot be held liable under Title VITs disparate-treatment provision for attempting to comply with Title VITs dispa-rate-impact bar. Petitioners countered that respondents good-faith belief was not a valid defense to allegations of disparate treatment and unconstitutional discrimination. 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., as amended, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination (known as disparate treatment ) as well as, in some cases, practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as disparate impact ). 

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not include an express prohibition on policies or practices that produce a disparate impact. But in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,91 S.Ct 849,28 LJid.2d 158 (1971), the Court interpreted the Act to prohibit, in some cases, anployers facially 2673 neutral practices that, in fact, are discriminatory in operation. Id., at431,91 S.Ct. 849. The Griggs Court stated that the touchstone for disparate-impact liability is the lack of business necessity If an employment practice which operates to exclude [minorities] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. Ibid. see also id., at 432, 91 S.Ct. 849 (anployer s burden to danonstrate that practice has a manifest relationship to the employment in question ) Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). 

Petitioners allege that when the CSB refused to certify the captain and lieutenant exam results based on the race of the successful candidates, it discriminated against them in violation of Title VITs disparate-treatment provision. The City counters that its decision was permissible because the tests appear[ed] to violate Title VITs disparate-impact provisions. Brief for Respondents 12. 

The District Court did not adhere to this principle, however. It held that respondents motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact... does not, as a matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent 554 F.Supp.2d, at 160. And the Government makes a similar argument in this 2674 Court. It contends that the structure of Title VII belies any claim that an employer s intent to comply with Title VITs disparate-impact provisions constitutes prohibited discrimination on the basis of race. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. But both of those statements turn upon the City s objectiveavoiding disparate-impact liability— while ignoring the City s conduct in the name... 

We consider, therefore, whether the purpose to avoid disparate-impact liability excuses what otherwise would be prohibited disparate-treatment discrimination. Courts often confront cases in which statutes and principles point in different directions. Our task is to provide guidance to employers and courts for situations when these two prohibitions could be in conflict absent a rule to reconcile them. In providing this guidance, our decision must be consistent with the important purpose of Title VII—that the workplace be an environment free of discrimination, where race is not a barrier to opportunity. 

At the opposite end of the spectrum, respondents and the Govermnent assert that an employer s good-faith 2675 belief that its actions are necessary to comply with Title VIFs disparate-impact provision should be enough to justify race-conscious conduct. But the original, foundational prohibition of Title VII bars employers from taking adverse action because of... race. ... 

S" The same interests are at work in the interplay between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of 2676 Title VII. Congress has imposed liability on employers for unintentional discrimination in order to rid... 

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