Challenger accident

Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. (1986). Washington, DC U.S. Government Printing Office. 

A large number of proteins and other biomolecular crystals have been grown in space. The first Shuttle flight after the Challenger accident (STS-26) yielded crystals of 4 different proteins that were shown to have better diffraction resolution than the best crystals of these proteins that had ever been grown on Earth. This feat was even more remarkable, considering that the crystals produced in only a handful of space experiments were compared with the best crystals of these particular proteins that had been grown in... 

Twenty years later, another Space Shuttle was lost. While the proximate cause for the Columbia accident (foam hitting the wing of the orbiter) was very different than that for Challenger, many of the systemic causal factors were similar and reflected either inadequate fixes of these factors after the Challenger accident or their reemergence in the years between these losses [117]. 

In some industries, system safety is viewed as having its primary role in development and most of the activities occur before operations begin. Those concerned with safety may lose influence and resources after that time. As an example, one of the chapters in the Challenger accident report, titled The Silent Safety Program, lamented ... 

Figure 4.7. Roger Boisjoly, before the Presidential Commission investigating the Challenger accident, February 25,1986.

Let s not kid ourselves, even a seasoned engineer can miss the mark by a fair amount. Whenever I make a presentation, I start by showing the graph in Fig. 39.1. This material was taken from the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, June 6, 1986, Washington, D.C. 

Challenger accident, the solid-rocket boosters could be considered a subsystem. When the hot gases broke through the O-ring, a component of the subsystem, a total system breakdown began as a cascade effect that ultimately destroyed the orbiter. This analysis should be started no later than the definition phase in the system life cycle and continue until the beginning of the system production phase. Analysis techniques include Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), discussed in more detail in the next section (Roland and Moriarty, 1990). 

Vaughan, D. 1997. The trickle-down effect policy decisions, risky work, and the Challenger accident. California Management Review 39(Winter), 1-23. 

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