Causal inheritance principle

This is in fact the view Jaegwon Kim has advanced in several places about instances of second-order properties and instances of their first-order realizers.As Kim has noted, such an identification requires a revision of his property-exemplification account of events assuming that mental properties are second-order properties, it requires the exclusion of mental properties as constitutive properties of events. This instance-identity thesis is supposed to support reductionism about the mental. But there is a tension between this thesis and Kim s formulation in several places of his causal inheritance principle, which says that the causal powers of an instance of a higher-order property are identical with or are a subset of [emphasis mine] the causal powers of the instance of its realizer. Clearly, if the causal powers of the realized property instance were... 

I think that the subset version of the causal inheritance principle is clearly preferable to the version that says that the causal powers of the realized property instance are identical with the causal powers of the realizer instance, so I think that the instance-identity thesis is false. We can make sense of the idea of an instance of a higher-order property having a realizer different from the realizer of the instance of its determinate or property realizer if we can make sense of the idea of the higher-order property instances having cores that are distinct from the cores of the realizers of the instances of their determinates or physical property realizers. And 1 think we can do this. 

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