Canberra Plan metaphysics

So, Kim departs from the Canberra Plan precisely for mental properties whose substantive nature and need for metaphysical grounding are most obvious, favoring dualism. I think his view here is clearly superior to the views of Lewis, which treat all mental properties as equally lacking in ground. 

To sum up, the Canberra Plan does not adequately capture the physicalist reductionist point of view because it neglects ground that is, it does not involve any sort of metaphysical physicalism. 

What was wrong with AI approaches to consciousness is invisible from the point of view of the Canberra Plan with its excessive focus on ontology at the expense of metaphysics. The flaw in traditional AI was metaphysical. It was not that the Al-ers failed to notice that neurotransmitters have important causal or computational roles. They had the mistaken view that the metaphysical problem of mind could be solved at a level of description that paid no attention to details of neuroscience. Now that mistake can be corrected in one of two ways ... 

The Canberra Plan is supposed to be a model of reductive physicalism, but it neglects ground, sacrificing what I am calling metaphysics on the altar of ontology. In particular, it has no room for an account of the physicalistic ground of mentality. I mentioned that the kind of reductive physicalism acknowledged by the Canberra Plan is blind to the dualistic implications of the Commander Data case, so the account of reductive physicalism is inadequate. 

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