English auction

Ascending bid auctions, see English auctions Ascension MotionStar, 1125 As-if bias, 1023... 

Milgrom and Weber (1982) describes a variant of the English Auction where the price is posted electronically. All bidders are active at price zero. The price is raised continuously, and a bidder who wishes to remain active at the current price must depress a button. When she releases the button, she is dropped out of the auction. No bidders who has dropped out can become active again. After any bidder withdraws, all remaining bidders know the price at which she drops out. When there is only one bidder left in the room, the auction ends. McAfee (1992) proposes an oral double auction work in a similar fashion, but with multiple buyers and sellers. In the following, we use the oral double auction model to characterize the basic functions of exchange coordination carried out by a market intermediary (see Figure 3.4). 

As a special case, we get the celebrated revenue-equivalence theorem [100, 65], which states that the most popular auction formats, i.e. English, Dutch, first-price sealed-bid and second-price sealed-bid, all yield the same price on average in a single item allocation problem with symmetric agents. This is an immediate consequence because these auctions are all efficient in the simple private values model. 

Faruk Gul and Ennio Stacchetti. The English auction with differentiated commodities. Journal of Economic Theory, pages 66-95, 2000. 

In the auction of a single object, it has long been known that an open (ascending) auction exists that duplicates the outcomes of the Vickrey auction. This is the English auction, in which the auctioneer continuously raises the price for the object. An agent is to keep his hand raised until the price exceeds... 

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