US Strategic Air Command

The main thrust of the Swinton Committee s report in November 1954 was its support for the RAF s case for a nuclear deterrent of 240 V-bombers. It was argued that the very survival of Britain in war would depend upon the prompt elimination of Soviet air bases, and that that task could not be left to the US Strategic Air Command as there could be no assurance about American priorities as regards targets. This argument was publicly stated by Churchill on 1 March 1955 in the debate on the 1955 Defence White Paper, which announced the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb. ° Yet the priority for the nuclear deterrent was not absolute the White Paper also stated that Britain must play its part in defending the interests of the free world as a whole, and particularly the Commonwealth and Empire , in the Cold War, for which role the army and navy were required. ... 

The committee invited representatives from all of the DOD Combatant Commands and the Services to brief the group on their perspectives on the CBD Program and its objectives and capabilities. At its fifth meeting, the committee held discussions with representatives from US European Command and US Northern Command. The committee also spoke with US DOD Service representatives to the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense from the US Army and US Marines. Due to unforeseen circumstances, US Strategic Command and the Service representative from the US Air Force, were unable to participate. 

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