Rival Explications

It is as committal as and more fundamental than rival explications (Chaps. 8 and 9). 

Based on revisions of these four aspects, a characterization of reductive explanation is suggested in Chap. 5. Mechanistic dependence is usually conceived of as a dependence relation between different entities, a complex and its constituents. Reductive dependence involves one entity and two semantic values that both represent this entity. The relation between these semantic values that gives rise to reductive dependence is a relation between modes of presentations, where modes of presentations are characterized in terms of property structures. Intuitively, different property stmctures can depict one and the same entity at different levels of constitution. A more thorough version of the definition of the core notion of reduction can be offered. Several derivative notions can be defined. Explanatory directionality turns out to be tied to conceptual diversity. Two rival explications, a two-dimensionalist and a pragmatist one, are briefly discussed. 

The explication proposed here does not only shed light on conceptions of reduction in the philosophy of science it is also more fundamental than its most prominent rivals, namely, explications according to which reduction is a relation that holds primarily between theories. We are, thus, here ... 

Thus, the explication captures an important use of the term, it meets the intuitive description and paradigmatic cases, it can deal with alleged problems, it turns out to be more fundamental than its most prominent rival, and it is fruitful not only in the context of reduction debates. 

Reductionists are committed to the idea that reduction-relations structure the actual world. The explication proposed here gives a coherent picture of what these relations consist in, and it performs better than its rivals. The reductionist s commitment has thus been made explicit. 

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