Neilson, Keith

Neilson, Keith, Strategy and Supply The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914-1917, London Allen and Unwin, 1984. 

Keith Neilson, That dangerous and difficult enterprise British military thinking and the Russo-Japanese War , War and. Society, 9 (1991), 11-31. 

London Heinemann, 1972), pp. 409-10. Gilbert believes that Churchill s advocacy of an attack by ships alone contributed to the War Council s self-deception that troops could be dispensed with Winston S. Churchill, vol. Ill, pp. 249, 311). The Russians did not propose an attack on the Dardanelles. Indeed, they were anxious lest any Balkan bloc created by an Allied victory might prejudice their claims to Constantinople see Keith Neilson, Strategy and Supply The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914-17 (London Allen and Unwin, 1984), pp. 57-78. 

Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933—1939 (London Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 123—5, 136—7, 145—6 Keith Neilson, The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee , English Historical Review, 118 (2003), 651—84. 

Kennedy, Greg, and Keith Neilson (eds.). Far Flung Lines Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman, London Frank Cass, 1997. 

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