NASA continued communication

In early January 2001, NASA released a new report that was, in effect, the final word on the Mars failures. The report retained the FSB approach but argued for better implementation, clarity, and communication - in a way establishing the continuation of the initiative with or without Goldin as Administrator. The safety panel report of 2001 warned against the combination of inexperienced people and increased flight rate being associated with the ISS. 

Various authors discuss how NASA shouid define acceptable risk (chapter 5), whether NASA should continue to fly shuttles (chapter 2), whether repetitive failures are inevitable (chapter 3), how NASA s scientific and engineering communities could benefit from social-science input (chapter 17), and how to make NASA more effective (chapter 16). 

Of course, there are those within the agency and in the space-exploration community who still aren t convinced. USA Today recently reported the views of those who think NASA s culture has not been fixed. Debates have emerged, as reported Friday in the New York Times, on the methods for measuring the actions taken to meet the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Such opinions show the dialogue is continuing. 

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