Behaviour game-playing

In one sense the logic is compelling. If (i) the game is played only once, (ii) the actors are motivated solely by the payoff in the matrix and (iii) they behave rationally, collective action mMSf fail. By contraposition, we might look into the possibilities for collective action if the interaction is repeated several times if the payoffs that motivate the actors differ from the material reward structure and if the behaviour is less than fully rational. It turns out that under all these conditions, collective action does become possible. The three cases correspond to what was referred to earlier as rationaIity-cum-selfishness rationality simpliciter and irrationality. 

Reichert, S. E., 1978, Games spiders play Behavioural variability in territorial disputes, Behav. Ecol Sociobiol., 3 135. 

What is interesting abont the beer game is that it has been played so many times yet the patterns of behaviour generated in the game are remarkably similar The beer game introduces the players to the phenomenon known as the buUwhip effect . In practice, this phenomenon is observed in all forms of the supply chain but especially in retail supply chains. 

The problem is made more interesting by playing it repeatedly with the same group of players, thereby permitting partial time histories of behaviour to guide future decisions. This so-called iterated prisoner s dilemma has drawn interest from game theorists for a while. 

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