Vulnerability analysis


Section 3. Vulnerability Analysis (modeling of releases)  [c.268]

Section 5. Emergency Response Planning (assembling hazards, vulnerability analysis, and risk analysis information).  [c.268]

VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (continued)  [c.274]

The uncertainty may be addressed by constructing a base case which represents the most probable outcome, and then performing sensitivities around this case to determine which of the inputs the project is most vulnerable to. The most influential parameters may then be studied more carefully. Typical sensitivities are considered in Section 13.7, Sensitivity Analysis .  [c.307]

Plasma etching can create a variety of damaging effects to a substrate. Typical damage effects include gate oxide breakdown, high reverse leakage current, low minority carrier lifetime, contamination, damage to the siUcon surface charge, and lattice damage (43). The sources of the damage can be typically attributed to either or both of two effects current flow-induced damage and plasma exposure damage. The first affects primarily the dielectric layers, where voltage across the dielectric produces wear-out from bond-breaking, trapping, or both. The second is a side effect of particle or photon flux impingement on the substrate materials (44). The regions that are most vulnerable to physical damage include the area in the oxide layer, at the layer interfaces, and in the siUcon substrate. As of 1994, damage detection, measurement, and analysis are not adequate for submicrometer designs.  [c.353]

For more details refer to Section 24.8. It is possible that in the course of time more generating stations may be installed to meet the rising demand for power. Their feeding lines too will be added to the existing grid to augment its capacity. This would also enhance the fault level of the existing system. To ensure that the prescribed fault level is not exceeded, a detailed network analysis may be carried out to determine the minimum possible impedance of the grid, at various vulnerable locations, to establish the likely revised fault level. If it is felt that it may exceed the prescribed limit, current-limiting series reactors may be provided at suitable locations to yet  [c.347]

Nuclear reaction analysis (NRA) is used to determine the concentration and depth distribution of light elements in the near sur ce (the first few lm) of solids. Because this method relies on nuclear reactions, it is insensitive to solid state matrix effects. Hence, it is easily made quantitative without reference to standard samples. NRA is isotope specific, making it ideal for isotopic tracer experiments. This characteristic also makes NRA less vulnerable than some other methods to interference effects that may overwhelm signals from low abundance elements. In addition, measurements are rapid and nondestructive.  [c.680]

The analysis of accidents and disasters in real systems makes it clear that it is not sufficient to consider error and its effects purely from the perspective of individual human failures. Major accidents are almost always the result of multiple errors or combinations of single errors with preexisting vulnerable conditions (Wagenaar et al., 1990). Another perspective from which to define errors is in terms of when in the system life cycle they occur. In the following discussion of the definitions of human error, the initial focus will be from the engineering and the accident analysis perspective. More detailed consideration of the definitions of error will be deferred to later sections in this chapter where the various error models will be described in detail (see Sections 5 and 6).  [c.39]

In practice, a consideration of the general quality of the PIFs (performance-influencing factors) (e.g., training, supervision, procedures) in the situation being evaluated will give a good indication of the overall likelihood of error in the specific operation being evaluated. Similarly, the consequences of errors can be evaluated in terms of the overall vulnerability to human error of the subsystem under consideration. By considering these factors together, it is usually obvious where the analysis should be terminated. Differing levels of detail may be necessary for different purposes, for example, risk analysis, training specification or procedures design.  [c.165]

Risk analysis is an assessment of tlie likelihood (probability) of an accidental release of a hazardous material and tlie actual consequences that might occur, based on tlie estimated vulnerable zones. The risk analysis is a judgment of probability and severity of consequences based on tlie history of previous incidents, local experience, and tlie best available current technological information. It provides an estimation of  [c.513]

Vulnerability analysis identifies areas in tlie community tliat may be affected or exposed, indviduals in tlie community who may be subject to injury or death from certain specific hazardous materials, and what facilities, property, or eiivironment may be susceptible to damage should a hazardous materials release occur. A comprehensive vulnerability analysis provides information on  [c.500]

A vulnerability analysis identifies tliose regions tliat may be affected or exposed, individuals who may be subject to injury or deatli, and wliat facilities, property, or enviromnent may be susceptible to damage should a liazardous materials release occur.  [c.511]

The checklist criteria were developed from information in the Nationail Response Team s Hgizardous MateritJs Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1) and the Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis. NRT-1 was designed to help local communities respond to potential incidents involving hazardous materials. The Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis supplements NRT-1 by identifying the facility and transportation route information necessary for hazards analysis and emergency planning, providing guidelines for determining vulnerable zones, and outlining the process for analyzing risks.  [c.268]

HDetect Financial Risks. In addition to physical injuries, a company may be injured by the perception of injury that result in law suits, drop in stock price, and reduction in sales. A detailed analysis (2) will as.scss vulnerability but it docs not directly address the perception factor. A case in point is TMI-2 which complied with 10 CFRIOO, had no injuries and no deaths, but the company was driven to near-bankruptcy. Similarly with Bhopal and Union Carbide, although there were deaths.  [c.294]

Phase 1 identified vulnerable plant CDFs as high, medium, or low and provided core damage accident scenarios and risk information for a more detailed Phase 2 analysis in which MLO " was selected because it is the most hazardous shutdown condition. Phase 1, plant outages are refueling, drained maintenance, non-drained maintenance with the residual heat removal (RHR) system, and non-drained maintenance without the RHR system. Plant operational states (POSs were defined and characterized for each outage type. Each POS is characterized by a set of operating conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure, and configuration). For example, 15 POSs are useil to represent a refueling outage. Each POS used Surry-specific data from reviewing operating and abiionual shutdown procedures, shift supervisor logs, monthly operating reports, and by performing thermal-hydraulic calculations (details are in Volumes 3 and 4 of NUREG/ CR-6144).  [c.388]

The internal fire analysis is conventional. Surry-specific fire frequencies were a scs cd for important plant areas involving cable fires, transient fires, and equipment fires as a local phenomenon. The analysis locates the fire source and vulnerable equipment and/or cables. Cables of important systems were traced for vulnerability to a fire in various locations. Fire growth calculations (COMPBRN-lIIe) were performed for the most vulnerable locations. A transition-diagram type of suppression model was used, which, in conjunction with the fire growth model, gives the probability of damage given a fire in that location. The damage fraction with event tree and fault tree models gives the core damage frequency (CDF) for a fire scenario. The scenario-dependent human error probabilities (HEPs) were estimated using the same human reliability analysis (HRA) method that was used in the internal event analysis.  [c.389]

Risk analysis is an assessment of the likelihood (probability) of an accidental release of a hazardous material and tlie actual consequences tliat might occur, based on tlie estimated vulnerable zones. It provides an estimation of tlie likelihood (probability) of an accidental release, tlie severity of consequences of human injuiy that may occur, the severity of consequences on critical facilities, tlie severity of consequences of damage to property, and the severity of consequences of damage to tlie enviromiient.  [c.535]


See pages that mention the term Vulnerability analysis : [c.273]    [c.484]    [c.500]    [c.439]   
See chapters in:

Handbook of emergency response to toxic chemical releases  -> Vulnerability analysis

Health, safety and accident management in the chemical process industries  -> Vulnerability analysis


Health, safety and accident management in the chemical process industries (2002) -- [ c.500 , c.501 , c.502 , c.503 ]